**Résumé :** Welfare States do not insure citizens against the risk of premature death, i.e., the risk of having a short life. Using a dynamic OLG model with risky lifetime, this paper compares two insurance devices reducing well-being volatility due to the risk of early death: (i) an ante-mortem age-based statistical discrimination policy that consists of an allowance given to all young adults (including the unidentified adults who will die early); (ii) a post-mortem subsidy on accidental bequests due to early death. Each policy is financed by taxing old-age income. Whereas each device can yield full insurance, the youth allowance is shown to imply a higher lifetime well-being at the stationary equilibrium. The marginal utility of consumption exceeding the marginal utility of giving when being dead, the youth allowances system is, despite imperfect targeting, a more efficient mechanism of insurance against the risk of early death
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48.0760900000-0.8090800000location_onSAINT-BERTHEVIN ~ 64.6 km
48.0573900000-0.7613400000location_onLAVAL ~ 68.3 km
48.0793792000-0.7506931000location_onLAVAL ~ 68.9 km
48.0838500000-0.8026200000location_onLAVAL ~ 65 km
{"355468":["CREM - Centre de Recherche en \u00c9conomie et Management","crem",{"https:\/\/openagenda.com\/crem\/events\/seminaire-crem-social-insurance-against-a-short-life-ante-mortem-versus-post-mortem-policies":1726012800}]}
